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Ethics and Sovereignty
William L. Blizek and Rory J. Conces
Department of Philosophy and Religion, Univers ity of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68182-0265

In the political arena, every nation is considered to be
sovereign. T hat is. what happens within the legitimate borders of a nation, what docs not affect other nations, is 10 be
decided by the people of that nation or the government of'
thnt nation and no one else. If a nation wants to centralize
economic decisions, that is its business. If a nation wants a
free market economy, no other nation can interfere. If a nation wants to be represented by a new form of government,
it has the right to change governments. And so on.
Outside or the political arena, however, in the arena of
ethics. can we say that the ethics of each nation is sovereign

in the sarnc way that its poli tical arrangements arc sovereign? Are the moral rules o f each nation to be decided by
the people of that nation and no one else? Is it wrong for
any other nation to intervene in the ethical li fe ofa nation
that has selected its own set of ethical rules? Or, docs ethics
go beyond political boundaries·? If it is right for some, is it
not right for everyone? Aren't there some kinds of behav ior

thm we can condc1nn Crom an ethical point of view. even if
they have been selected by the people of some other nation?
A ll of these questions arc being raised as the morality

or nations becomes widely known and the ethical behavior
of a nation can be known around the world instantaneously.
The more we know about the ethics of nations, the more
frequently such questions arc likely to arise, leaving us with
the question or how we arc to understand ethics and the
sovereignty of nations. In the following. we try to make a
contribution to that understanding.

I
There are two familiar ways to see the relationship between ethics and sovereignty. TI1e lirst is to say that ethics,
like politics. is a mailer fo r each nation to decide for itself
and it is not the business of any other nation 10 interfere
with that decision. The second is 10 say that ethics reaches
beyond sovereignty, that some things are right or wrong,
independently of what the people of any nation elaim. We
wi ll consider each of these views in turn.
If we accept the view that the ethics of any nation is
sovereign, in the way that i1s politics and laws are sovcr•

eign, we encounter all of the problems associated with what
is frequently called "cultural relativism." The basic problem of cultural relativism is that it prevents us from saying
or any other culture that what they do is wrong. as long as

what they do conforms to the ethical standards adopted by
that culture. If, for example, the people of one culture (or
nation) decide to practice apartheid, then no other culture
can say that what they are doing is wrong, as long as what
they are doing is confonning to the standard of apartheid.
Outsiders could say that what the people of another
culture arc doing is wrong, but they could only say this of
actions that violated the ethical standard or that society. For
example, we could say or any culture that had adopted apartheid that its people were ucting wrongly or th.ti one or ils
policies was wrong, if we arc rcforring to aclions or policies
1hat arc contrary to apartheid. Outsiders could also say th:u

what the people or a culture are doing is wrong, but they
could only mean by this that what those people arc doing is
not what we consider to be right, and nothing more. What
we cannot say if cultural relmivism is corrcc1 (or if 1hc cth•
ics of natio11s arc sovereign) is that whm people do in other
cultures that conforrns to their own moral standards is "re·
ally" wrong.
But, it is j ust this problem that causes us 10 abandon the
perspective of cultural relativism. We do believe that some
actions arc wrong. even ir they have been adopted by the
people or another culture (or even some people in our own
culture). We believe, for example, th::u apartheid is wrong,

really wrong, even if some culture adopts apartheid as a
1>0liey ror treating some of its people differently from others. We hclicvc that ethnic clcnnsing is wrong. even if it is :1
practice adopted by other cultures. We believe that executing suspected dissidents without a trial, a fair trial (i.e., without reall y knowing whether the suspects have behaved n,
they have been charged) is wrong, even if this is a common
practice in other cultures.
And we do not just think that such behaviors arc morally wrong, for we expect others to agree that such behaviors are morally wrong-although we might not expect the
agreement of those who participate in such behaviors. 111c

wrongness of such behaviors does not Iie in the fact that the
behaviors arc different from our own culture's behaviors,

but that they arc uni versally wrong. 11,cy would he wrong
in our own culture if we adopted those behaviors. We think
such behaviors arc really wrong, and not just wrong as a
matter of taste or culture.
As long as we view some behaviors as wrong across
cultures, then we must reject cultural relativism and with it
1he view that the ethics of nations arc sovereign in the same
way lhut the internal politics of m!lions arc sovereign .
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II
The second famili ar way of viewing ethics ;md sovereignty is 10 ~cc the cahics of our own culture as corrcc,. or

more enloghtcned. or more civilitcd, than the ethics of other
cultures (at least some other cultures) and. therefore. asap,
plying to other cultures, whether or not they accept or":"ogni,.c th;ll application. Some cultures arc morally superior
tn others, anti lhosc cultures or moral superiority hnvc the

right. indeed the obligation, 10 instruct other cultures in their
morality or even to bring about changes io the ethics of other
culturcs-po,;sibly even by some form of coercion.
But this view of ethics and sovereignty runs into its
own set of problems. These problems we would identify as
the problems of coloniali sm. Thnt is, one culture or notion
treats the people of other cultures badly {from the moral
point of view) by forcing them to conform 10 particular standards. all m the name of1rca11ng them well. i.e.. improving
their morality. E,·en condemning another culture, because
it docs not conform 10 all of our own standards. is a way of
treating another culture in a morall y inapproprinte ,v_ay.
Theoreticall y. we arc willing 10 say that the voew of
ethics and ~ovcrcignty thnt includes cuhurnl rclnuvbrn is

wrong. Tho~ means that there arc some things that arc rc~lly
right or wrong. regardless of how another culture perceives
them. 111c prohlcm with what we arc calling the colonial
perspective is not a theoretical problem, but rather u practical problem. It is the problem of seeing what we dons right
simply because we do it or we arc familiar with it. '!"is
tendency 1s a common one and if we are to talk meaningfully about cthi~ across boundaries, we will have 10 make
an cffon 10 curb this tendency.
Since neither of the familiar views seems 10 us n salisfoctory way 10 understand ethics and sovereignty. we make
the following proposal. The ethics of nntions arc not sovereign-to avoid the problems of cultural rela1ivism-bu1 the
ethics of any gl\·cn nalion are not necessarily ethics thal
apply to everyone-the problem or believing that my values arc correct because lhcy nrc mine. What is required is a
case hy case cx:1mination or lhc vnrious values or prncticcs

of any nation 10 sec if they meet some sense of moralily to
which people from different cultures can agree. Is the example before us more like a c:isc where there is wide agreement that such behavior is wrong? Or, is it closer 10 one in
which one culture tries to imp<>se its views on another.

1r this thcorctical undcrsrnnding, call it the case study
method if you will. is to be ,aiisfactory, then it will have 10
work in praclice. We would now like to apply this method
10 scvcr:il examples.

III
Legal Punis hment
The first set of case studies concerns various forms of
legal punishmenl. On the one hand, there seems to be a clear
acknowlcdgmenl in the United State., and elsewhere lhat
imprisonmcnl or incapacit:llion is a onor.illy acceptable fonn
of punishment. particularly when certain conditions nrc be·

lieved 10 have been satisfied. Assuming thal the original
conviction was a just one, lhese conditions may include a
prohibition on 1he severity of 1hc imprisonment unduly ex·
cccding the morn! grnvi1y of the offense {i.e.. an acknowledgment of a rule of proportionality) and the requirement
that the conditions of imprisonment should include adequate
health care and protection from others who arc confined in
the same facility {i.e.. an acknowledgment that 1ho,e in the
custody of 1he state should be trcmed in a humane way).
On the other hand, there seems 10 be wide agreement.
albeit far less 1han the agreement on imprisonment. that the
death penalty is morally wrong. Some may argue that the
death penalty consiuutes a denial of the offender·s d1gnily
as a human being, while others object 10 it on the grounds
that it is an act or revenge. Still others may view the death
penalty as immoral not because the act of puuing someone
10 death is in principle mor:illy rcpugnanl. but because lhc
punishment may not satisfy the "demands of justice" which
requires punishing only the guilty. In the worst case scennrio. capital punishment may be used to intimidate or ter,
rorizc some segment of a society. 111e trial and execution of
the Nigerian playwright and human-rights activist Ken SaroWiwa in 1995 b a case in point. Out lhe "demands or JUS·
1ice" may also not be served by the legal system found m
1he United States. How could this be? First, it is not true
thnl every person who kills another human being is guihy
of perpetrating ncrimc. It is quite common for people to die
ns a result of nn accident or an act of justifiable or cxcus:oble homicide. But even if ii Is clear 1ha1 several persons
have commiued crimes by killing another human being. it
should not be taken for granted that they are guilty of comrniuing the same crime. Each person may be found guihy of
having commilled one of scvcrnl crimes: first-degree mur·
der, sccond,degrcc murder, or manslaughler. In the case of
a post-Flln11a11 c.,pital murder trial, if the jury decided agamst
the defendant on the issue of guilt or innocence by handing
down the verdict of guilty of capilal murder, then the jury
would have 10 decide on the issue of death or life imprison·
ment. 1 In the penally s1agc of the trial procedure, the jury
would be required 10 consider all aggravating and mitigaling circums1ances in deciding whether the death penally is
the proper punishmcnl for the convicted defendant. Possible
aggravating circumslances include lhe capital felony being
eommilled for pecuniary gain or that it was especially hci•
nous, atrocious. or cruel; possible miligati ng circumst:mces
include the defendant having no significant history of prior
criminal activity or that the defendant was under duress al
the time of 1hc crime.'
Given the series of discretionary stages of the American criminal justice process, it is apparent thal judgcmenls
concerning someone's guilt and dcscn can be affected by a
number of irrclcvanl factors including ethnic and racial attitudes. Indeed. some s1a1istical studies have shown that
blacks killing whites have the greatest chance of being given
the death penally, while whites killing blacks have lhe least
chnnce of being executed. This is suggested by the disproportionaie pcrccntngc of blacks who nre under sentence of

£shies and Sovereig111y
death.' Apparently there is a sumcienl number of discretionary decisionmakers who believe that the seriousness of
one crime far outweighs that or another and so deserves a
more severe punishmcnl. So even afler the pos1-Fumia11
refonns were implemented, we have some reason not to be
overly confident that the American criminal justice system
can sort out those who deserve to be executed from those
who do not in a way that is both rational and just. If our
confidence has been compromised in any way, then perhaps we ought 10 reject the death penally as a legal form of
punishment in the United States.
But what about caning as a legal rorm of punishment
for an offence such as vandalism? Is caning a case where
there is wide agreement that such punishment is morally
wrong (similar to the case of capirnl punishment) or does
the uproar against il make it closer lo one in which one culture Lrics to impose its views on another? Caning appears to
be closer 10 the lauer. Take the recent case of Michael Fay.
Michael Fay was an A111cric~111 tccnagcr Ii ving in Si ngaporc.

In 1994 Fay was arrested and found guilty or several acts of
vandalism, including a week long spree of spray-painting
gram ii on cars. His punishment included a line, a jail sentence, and being given four strokes with a ranen cain.' The
sentence brought world-wide condemnation of Singapore's
treatment of Fay. The issue was not whether Singapore had
stringent crimin3l sanctions for rchuivcly minor acls. but
rather the severity of the punishment for vandalism. One
objection to the punishment was that 11did 11011,1 the cnmea violmion of the rule of proportionality. Those who voiced
this objection thought that the degree of punishment should
correspond 10 the degree of ham, or damage thm was done
by committing the illegal act, and that acts of vandalism did
not warram a "physical beating." In defense of the sentence,
government leaders of Singapore explained 1ha1 the legal
system of 1hcir country owes more 10 those who abide by
the laws (and so must provide them with ample protection)
1lmn it does to those people who break the laws, whether or
not they arc ci1i,.cns of Singapore. In other words, the heart
of the mauer for Singapore's leaders was the maintenance
of social order. The assumption was that such harsh penalties would serve as a deterrent 10 those who might consider
perpetrating such crimes in the future. And in so doing, the
leadership of Singapore satisfied its obligation no110 act in
ways rendering it unlikely that future generations in
Singapore can have an equall y high standard of living.
Critics of Singapore's 1rea1men1 ofFay, especially those
from the Uniled S1a1es, cited their own society as a standard
by which all others should be measured. For example, ii
was said 1ha1 those who live in the United States live in a
country thn.t takes seriously a broad notion of freedom and

individual rights. which in some way tempers punishmems
that would otherwise be considered cruel and unusual. For
example. rather than caning the individual. police and prosecutors in the United States often dispose or such offenses
with n warning. probation, or restitution. The government

of Singapore, however, has given more importance 10 the
notion of "collective security" than lo individual freedoms

J

and rights. But the result is 1101 all bad. In some ways life in
Singapore is more pleasant than life in some me1ropoli1:1n
areas of the United States. 111c screets arc clean and J>Cdcstrians arc relacively safe and secure from violent assault.
Not many Americans who live in urban centers such as New
York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles can say the same about
theirslreets and personal safety. Nevertheless. many Americans would say that the cost of such security is 100 great; on
the one hand, quick and severe punishment for those persons who seek 10 breach the security of those around them
and. on the other hand, a far more restricted view of freedom and rights.•
But who is 10 say which approach carries with ii a
greater degree or moral legitimacy? Is a nation whose government cxhibils a degree of authoritarianism in order lo

protect those who live within ils territorial boundaries,
though at a cost or certain freedoms and rights, morally superior to a na1ion who~c government allows for a wider .and
<lccrx:r dispersal of frccd<nns ,.an<l a more s1ringcn1 proh.:1,;1ion of incJividual right$, though m the cost or allowing for
what seems 10 be a certain degree of "anarchy"? In the absence of caning being an egregious violation of hum:m ritht.s,
which would be the impetus for widespread moral rejection
of this form or punishmenc, the case of caning seems 10 be
one of ethics as sovereign. It is precisely because caning is
used 10 inhibil the erosion of the social fabric, which is essential for democracy and the development of human potential, that the chOice of how people will determine the
shape of their associmions should be left up to them. If freedom means living life lo the fullest such that a citizen has
the ability to satisfy his or her material and intellectual needs
and desires-in other words, 10 develop his or her potential, then perhaps freedom should be measured in cerms or
not only nOn·intcrfercncc wi1h a person's rights but also in

tenns of a person's security. Is a woman who has her prop-

cny vandalized. free? Is a man in consrnm fear of having
his possessions Ucstroycd rrcc to Uc velor himself to the full•

est of his potential? If government does not provide the conditions lo allow citizens to act according 10 their rights, then
citizens will not be able to pursue Lheir own values and ends,
10 pursue their own

vision of the good life. And if the development of one's potential is determined in part by the sociopolitical-cconomic conditions that the individual rinds himself or herself in, then perhaps the citizens ought lo decide
for themselves whether can ing is a morally permissible fonn
of punishment.

Bodily Mutilation
T he second set or cases concerns hodily muti lmion.
Taking the clearly acceptable case lirst, it seems that facial
mutilation (e.g .. facial scarring and piercing) is n case in
poin1. Although some people may not be inclined to perform gross mutila1ion on hi~ or her own fncc or on 1hc fncc

of a family member, facial mu1ilatiun docs nol seem IO he
morally objectionable if ii is undertaken voluncarily. This ,s
true in many societies: people arc generally allowed (or free)
10 treat their bodies as they please. Indeed, the facial scar-

,I
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ring that is c0tnmonly found in some TI1ird World countries
is in some ways quite simi lar to the morally acceptable procedure of cosmetic surgery (whether it involves a "nose job"
ror a 1ni<lc.Jlc· agc<l woman or the removal of a lail from a

newbo111) that is routinely done in the developed world.•
And, of course. there arc those less radical practices that are
found morally permissible throughout the world, practices
like piercing an car or nose with metal objects.
On the other hand, the ancient pract ice of female cir-

cumcision, often referred 10 as female genital muti lation
(FGM), is widely acknowledged as being morally wrong,
p;,nicularly when it is done involuntarily and when ii sc•
verdy compromises a woman's general health, capacity for
reproduction, or sexual pleasure.' Although this pmctice has
persisted for a variety of reasons, the involumary and compromising features seem 10 be at work in three of the four
basic fonns of female circumcision: .. sunna," excision, and
1he most radical form of 1hc practice, infibulation, or
"Pharonic" circumcision. Sunna circumcision involves the
removal of the prepuce or clitoral hood while allowing the
gland and body of the cl itoris 10 remain imnct. Excision.
sometimes c.tllctl "cliwridcclOmy," is 1hc most common

fonn of circumcision and oncn involves the removal of 1hc
enti re clitoris. Allhough the extent 10 which Lhese forms of
circumcision reduce 1he sexual pleasure of the woman is
unclear. the immediate c1Tcc1s of these procedures to a
woman's health arc quite apparcni.' They often include
shock. hemorrhaging, and serious bacterial infections. In
a<l<li1inn, 1hcrc o;1rc ortcn long-lcnn gynecological and gcnito,.
urinary complications resulling from these procedures. including infertility and diiTiculty in childbirth.• But of the
three forms of circumcision noted above, it is the radical
procedure of inribulation that has Lhc most deleterious effects on a woman's hcal~l. childbearing, and sexuality. This
is because inlibulation involves the removal of almost all
of the external female genitalia and what remains is sewn
togc1hcr leaving a small hole for the pass~lge of urine and
mcns,rual blood. Of course, the adverse effects can be severe with any of these forms. but the problems arc most
pronounced with infibulation. problems which range from
hemorrhage and acute infection lo chronic infection and
diiTicultics in childbinh.' 0
The growing acknowlcdgmcn11hat female genital mutilation is morally reprehensible is reflected in a number or
international legal documents 1ha1 have been adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly. One such document is
1hc Universal Declaration of Human Rights that was adopted
in 1948. It spells out 1hc fundamental human rights that
member states have pledged 10 protect as well as promote.
Among ~le articles tha1 pertain 10 female circumcision arc:
Article 3, ··Everyone has the right lo li fe, liberty and the
security of person": and Article 5. "No one shall be subjected lo torture or 10 cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."" Another powerful document is the
Convc111ion on 1hc Elimination or All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CED AW), which was adopted by the
General Assembly in 198 1. The CEDAW is a convention

that was specifically drafted 10 acknowledge that women
have an equal right 10 the fu ll enjoyment of human rights
and fundamental freedoms as do men. AILhough the con•
vcntion docs not mcn1ion genital mutilation by name, it is a
revolutionary document insofar as it acknowledges a linkage between custom and the restriction of women's enjoyment of their human rights. a linkage that encompasses fc.
male genital mutilation. Under the convention's Article 5.
for example, governments arc obliged to "'modify the social
and cultural paucrns of conduct of men and women, with a
view 10 achieving the e limination of prejudices and customary and all other practice., which arc based on the idea
or 1hc inferiority or the superiority of either of 1hc sexes or
on the stereotyped roles for men and women."" But it was
no1 until the United Nations World Conference on Human
Rights held in Vienna in June 1993 that the member states
took seriously the global dimensions of female-targeted violence. In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
member states declared that ~icy should work towards "Ll1e
elimination of violence against women in public and private life, the elimination of all fonns of sexual harassment.
exploitation and tmfficking in women. the elimination of
gender bias in the adrninis1rntion of justice and the eradica·
1ion or any conflicts which may arise between the rights of
women and the harmful effects of certain traditional or customary practices, cultural prejudices and religious cxtrcm·
ism."" But by far the most important resolution adopted by
the General Assembly was 1he 1993 Declaration on the
Eli1ni11ation uf V iu lcm.:cAgain.sL \Vomcn, Aniclc 2 of which

defined violence ngainsl women as including "physical.
sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family,
including bauering, sexual abuse of female children in the
household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female
genital 111111ilario11 [our italics) and other traditional practices harmful 10 women, non-spousal violence and violence
related to exploitation." 14
But what about genital mu1i la1ion that has liulc heahh
risk and that docs not hann a woman's capacity for reproduction or sexual pleasure? The least intrusive fom1 of female circumcision called ritualist ic circumcision, a procc~
dure that involves the clitoris· merely being ··nicked" by a
sharp instrument. is such a practice. Although it is a surgical procedure. il is no more in1rusivc, painful, and sexually
debilitating than male circumcision. a surgical procedure
that involves the removal of the fo reskin of the penis and
which. like the female procedure, can be followed by the
onset of infection. TI1c simi larities between male circumcision and ritualistic circumcision become clearer once we
realize that (I) male and female circumcision arc partly
rooted in religious ritual, the forrncrrepresenting a covenant
between God and His people in Judaism. whereas the laucr
is associated with the important virtue of chastity wi~iin
the Muslim religion; and (2) 1ha1 male and female circumcision often occurs 10 infants and young children. persons
who arc unable 10 give their consent lo the procedure." If
the analogy between the 1wo types of circumcision is mor•
ally relevant. then perhaps there is a dilemma of moral con-
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sistency that critics must acknowledge: either the moral
outrage that many show towards female circumcision should
be directed solely at lhe three most in1rusive fonns or lhe
proetice or their moral outrage towards ritualistic circumcision should be extended 10 male circumcision. For whatever reason. however, the analogy is not given much ere•

dence. thereby resulting in 1he dismissal or the dilemma.
Yet the growing condemnation or female circumcision has
not been confined 10 international organizations like the
United Nations, for several governments have also prohibited some. ir not all, forms of female circumcision within
their own territorial boundaries. In 1982. Sweden passed a
law making all forn1s or female circumcision illegal. ll is
likewise illegal in England and Somalia. And in the United
States. Congress appears 10 be confronting this practice by
pulling together legislation (HR 3247) that would make ii
illegal to perform female genital mutilation on a child in the
United States as well as informing all new immigrants that
the practice of fem.tic genital muti lation cannot he brought

the number of limes she gives birth during her lifetime is
subject 10 vigomus de bale. For example, there is a debate
among Catholics concerning the Church's prohibition of contraception and abortion as mora11y illegitimate in their own
right, regardless of how voluntari ly they may be used by a
woman. But, in principle, the idea of women being allowed
to make procreative decisions seems to be widely rccog·
nized 1hroughou1 the world. T he recent debate concerning
reproductive and sexual rights, especially the debate Ul the
United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women held
in Beijing in 1995. has brought much auent ion to this issue.
Al the core of this debate is the right lo de1erminc the size
and spacing of one's family. which is bound up with the
ideas of bodily integrity and sexual sclr-dcterrnination. Any
a11emp1 by a woman to voluntarily delay starling a fami ly
or 10 curb the s ize of her famil y seems 10 be rcnective of
these fundamental idcas. 17
On the 01her hand, population control is clearly wrong
when it prohibits competent individuals, i.e., those who have

the li-

into this cc.,untry. Mori.!ovcr, 1hc highest immigration court

the physical nnd psychological capacities as well

in the United States. the Board of Immigration Appeals, recently recognized the practice or female genital mu1i la1ion'
as a forrn of persecution and ruled that a 19-year-old West
African woman be granted political asylum.
Bui the question remains, at what point should ti pr.tclice like female circumcision be deemed "'dangerous"
enough 10 be an egregious violation of human rights, a violation that requires intervention on the part of international
organizations and governments? This issue is especially
pertinent given that all forms of circumcision for the two
genders have not been shown lO be surlicicntly dissimilar
in the way that they would have 10 be in order for us 10
render different moral and legal judgements, thereby e luding chnrgcs of selectivity, inconsistency, and even capriciousness. TI1ere must be important moral considerations in regard 10 the practice of female genital mu1ilation 10 outweigh
the moral reasons for respecting a nation's sovereignty and
to single out this mutilation as a practice 10 be banned worldwide. Even a '"condition of reasonableness." such that there
is some plausible basis for believing that a prohibition against
this practice will promote 10 some measure the well-being
of people worldwide, is not sutncicnt ir the prohibition is
self-serving for its sponsors.'"This would be renected in a
situation in which the countries of the North and West arc
pcrmiucd to continue male circumcision. while those of the

nancial resources to raise a child. from bearing children in

South and East are subject to stringent regulations prohibit-

strong case can be ,nndc that pronatalist policies (of, for
example, Romania underCeau~cscu) arc morally impermissible.
Take China's current one-child policy. which has hccn

ing the female forms.

Population Control
The third set of cases concerns populalion contrc ,I. On

the one hand, population control is clearly acccp1able in situations where it is undertaken voluntarily. Ways of limiting
1he fertility rate include hormonal me1hods, such as the birth
control pill and Norplant®: harrier mcthrnJ:,., su«.:h

;.ts

<lia-

phrngms. condoms. :tnd spermicides: IUDs: stcrilii:uion;
abstinence; surgical abonion: and chemical abortion. such
as RU 486. or course. the means by which a womnn li mits

tL<

nations in which doing so would not have an adverse effect
on 1hc econom ic development or the socio-political stltbilily or lite nation-stale. Questions of competency covering
such a rnnge or capacities seem to be relevant considerations
as regards whe1her someone ought to be allowed 10 have
children as well as the number of children 10 be had. Indeed. lhe quality or life should be more than that experienced by a perrcctly misernhlc person. Bul to prohibit those
women who arc adequately endowed in such a selling from
bearing children would be 10 act contrary 10 not only the
Beijing Declaration. but also Article 16 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which stales that ··Men and
women of full age ... have the right to marry and to found
a fomily." 11
But do we have good rea~on 10 say that it is morally

wrong for a govcrmr1cn1 or a developing nntion to coerce its

female citizens 10 not hove more than one child? Or, for thnt
mauer, is it morally wrong for such a government tococrcc
its remalc citizens 10 have children? Is there wide ngrecrnent that coercion in either situation is morally wrong or
are lhc moral objections just symptomatic of cultural domination? We believe there is a split decision; antinatalist population policies (of, for example. present-day China) rnay be
morally permissible given certain conditions. whcrea.'i

::i

one or the most controversial policies in the world . The

Chinese government became increasingly aware or its popu·
lation problem 1hroughou1 the 1970s, corning 101he reali,.,.
tion that even if its feni li ly rote were 10 drop 10 the ··replacement level" of ahout two children per woman, its pop1.1•
lution wou ld continue to grow for ill least 50 yc.:.irs bc(.;~1Usc
of "demographic momcmum·· (that is, each woman is h:tv·

ing fewer chi ldren, but the number of women who arc giv-

r,
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ing birth is much greater)." It was this rc.11iz,uion that led LO
the current one-child policy. At the core of the policy is a
set or benefits or incentives and punishments. For those
couples that pledge Lo have no more than one child (called
"one-child certified" families). a wide range of benefits are

most certainly demonstrated in China.'' China. the most
p0pulatcd country in the world. has a population or 1.23
billion persons and a population growth rate of 1.4%. Chino's
rapid population growth and the growth and distribution or
China's poor have resulted in numerous environmental prob-

or

made available. including allowances for medic.al care and

lems 1hat cover land, air, and water resources. Jn terms

housing, priority for schOQling and employment. and discounts for rood. But for those who exceed the allowable
number of children, there arc a set or severe lines and sanctions. Allhough the policy is enforced diITcrcntly in the urban centers than it is in the rural areas. it allows for a variety
or punishments ranging from restricting living accommod~Hions lo limiting employment opportunities. There arc even
allegations thnt the oflicial J>Olicy includes coerced abortions and stcrili z.ations.20 The latter allegations have especially led many individuals as well as governments to morally object to China's popul ation control pol ic ies. But
whereas those who object to China's policies emphasize the

China's land resources. the increase in population has re-

individuality and personal autonomy

or human rights. the

Chinese leadership has focused on the collective and social
unity as the key considerations allowing them to ensure
socio-economic development. In lhis sense no c>nc shc>uld
be allowed 10 impose a cost on others simply by having a
child. especially when doing so has a negative impact on
the distribution of goods and $Crviccs in a community. Some
interference in the personal and private part of peoples' lives
may be required if a community is to control its population
and to regulate the quality or life of its people.
These 1wo goals arc cxlremcly important for Chini1
because Lhcy arc inLcrt wined. Or course, in Lhc broader .scope

or things. the control or the world's p<)pulntion is an extremely imponanl goal. According to the United Nations
Population Division, the world's population is now approximately 5.77 billion and is growing at an annual rmcor 1.48%.
11,is means that the world's population will increase by 81
million next year and that the global population will double
in 43 ycars. 11 1llcsc startling ligurcs. however. Uo not necessitate n doomsday scenario for mankind. 11lis is because
,nuch c.an happen in the next four dcc:.ldcs. no1 10 mention

the fact that the variety or assumptions. choices. and unknown variables that surround the numerous estimates or
the human carrying capacity of the planet arc not well un-

derstood. ·1nis is made clear when we rcali1.c that these estimates range from I billion (a ligurc that mankind surpassed
quite some time ago) Lo I trillion.ll But given thnt more

than hair of these estimates fall within the range of 4 bi llion
and 16 billion, the issue or world population growth should
be wkcn as a serious concern. And it is not j ust a maucr of
sheer numbers o r people, for as nco-Malthusians and o thers
have indicated, a continued increase in world population is

linked 10 the rctardntion or dcvclopmcm and economic
growlh. the degradation of lhc environn1cn1. the cxaccrba·

tion of poveny, and a rise in social breakdown and armed
conmc1Y
Allhough these linkages may be played out differently
from counlry to country. the linkage of a 1argc population
that continues to grow and environmental dcgradt1lion is

sulted in a tremendous demand for timber and firewood.

thereby fun hcr resulting in increasing pressures on its for•
est resources. TI1ese same fores t ecosystems arc also in danger from land conversion because of the increasing need to
turn forests into crop producing acreage. But it is not only
the forest ecosystems that arc being destroyed or degraded,
for China's large p0pula1ion has been a principal cause for
grassland degradation as well as the degradation or amble
land due to poor land-use policies.
China is also paying a heavy price for having such a
large population in terms of air pollution due to the demand
fnr ever increasing amounts or energy. China already is the
world's leading producer and consumer or coal. Coal supplies three-quarters of China's energy and is the biggest
source or low atmospheric air pollution in cities as well a11
the principal source or sulfur dioxide that causes acid rain.
Some researchers have noted that air pollution has gotten
so bad in Chinn that current levels mirror lcvclsofairpollu·
tion or the developed countries during the 1950s.»
And in tcrrns of iLs water resources. China is facing
serious problems of water pollution caused primarily by the
drainage of industrial waste wntcr. The pollutants or 1h1s

runoff not only affect surface water, but groundwater as well,
which has conlributcd to frequent fres h water shortages in
China's urban centers.

It is in part a response to these and otherenvironmentnl
problems that plague China thal its leadership has soughtto
curb the damage that is being done to the environment in
the interest of the common good (i.e.. lhc quality oflire 1ha1
is suitable Lo its people). Consequently. China has sought
"public intervention" 10 control "pri vate action." or course.
population policies which include coercive sterilization and
abortion arc morally objectionable insofar as they involve
"cruel. inhuman, or degrading treatment." But a coercive
practice need not be morally improper. ll is when a policy is
a violation or Article 5 of the UN Universal Declaration or
Human Rights that we can persuasively claim ~mt the policy
is immoral.26 But docs a coercive policy that uses positive
incentives as well as the withholding or privileges be construed as a violation of Article 5? And what about Anicle 6
which concerns the founding or a family. Are such measures violations or this article? Once again, in the absence
or measures that arc egregious violations of human rights.
the case o f population comrol seems 10 be one or ethics or
sovereignty.

IV
What arc the obvio us lessons to be learned from this
exercise? First, practices thal are widely held to be morally
acceptable should be acknowledged as such and even pro-
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molcd when appropriale. Second, lhosc praclices lhat arc
widely rejeclcd as mor.illy unacceptable should be erndi·
cated. But are al l practices easily pigeonholed as heing ei1hcr morally acceptable o r unacccplable? Our s1udy sug·
gcs1s tha11his is n01 1he case. Indeed, caning, ri1uulis1ic cir·
cumcision. and China's one-child policy seem 10 be such
prac1iccs. But unlike prac1iccs 1hm arc clearly acccp1able or
unacccp1nblc. in which case s1cps lo promo1c or eradicate
them can be implcmcnlcd by governments or intcrnaLional
o rgani ,,a1ions. 1hcsc practices may p0sc a di lemma 10 1hose
who fom1ula1c and implcmenl policies 1ha1 affecl how people
live their lives. On first glance. some may argue 1ha1 ~uch

prac1ices should be lcCI alone, :u lcas1 ror 1hc present time.
because 10 do 01hcrwisc may suggest an ancmpt on the part
or some na1ions 10 fo rce 01hcr nu1ions 10 conform 10 pur1iculare1hical standards. thereby rekindli ng the colonialism
of yesteryear. Bul 1his leaves us wi1hou1 even 1hc barcsl of
cri1eria 10 decide for ourselves the range of momlly acccpl·
able measures 1hm our leaders (as well as leaders of regional
and international organizations) can tilkc with regards to

these "normmively fuzzy" prac1iecs. Can this be remedied
in some way'! \Ve think so. even if only in the mosl simp1c~t
of terms.
So what is lhe Clinlon adminis1rmion. for example. allowed 10 do concerning the 1hrcc cases al hand? Whal arc
the oplions open lo lhc administrali on? To begin wi1h. perhaps ii would be bc.s l lo consider whal kind of prncliccs we
arc dealing wilh. for this will in large measure help to dc1crminc what ~hould or shou1d no1 he done. One way 10 calegorizc such practices is to place them into one of two c.1tcgorics: s1a1c-dircc1cd prac1ices and culture-based pmc1iccs.
Those 1ha1 arc s1a1c-dircc1cd arc practices 1ha1 arc the direct
resuh of a govcrnmcnl's laws and/or policies. T hey arc practices 1ha1 would cease 10 be within a rcla1ivcly shon period
of1ime if1hc government responsible ror thcm lOok slcps 10
change the rclcvanl laws and/or policies. Ahhough srntc
sponsored terrorism is nn act that is or the "obviousl)' inl·
moral category." measures laken by 1hc govcrnmenl of Iran
to cunail terrorism, such as withholding Jogis1ical :mcl fi.
nancial support from lhe pro-Iranian Hizbullah in Lebanon.
would be an example of such a policy change. On lhc 01hcr
hand, cul1urc-bascd prac1iccs are nol slale-direclcd. lhough
they may be sta1c-sanc1ioned (i.e .. 1hc prac1iccs arc neither
promolcd nor discouraged by the govcrnmcn1). T hey arc
prac1iccs 1ha1. over 1i mc. have become a way of life forcertain scgmenls of lhe popula1ion.
lnlo which of lhcsc calegorics do we place caning. rilu·
alislic circumcision, and China's one-child policy? Caning
and China's one-child policy arc c lear cases of s1a1c-dircc1cd
prac1iccs. The forme r is a punishmcn11ha1 is a pan of lhe
cri minal code of Singapore, whereas 1hc laner is an official
s1a1c policy of China. Surely. bolh of1hcsc prac1ices would
cease lo be iflhc govcrnmcnls of Singapore and China took
slcps to rcwri1c i1s criminal code or i1s populaiion policy
rcspcc1ivcly. On lhc other hand. ri1ualis1ic c ircumcision
seems 10 be a cuhurc-bascd pmc1icc 1ha1 is lolcrnlcd by many
governments around lhc world.
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We can now con~idcr the options opc.n to ;1 Uisgrum lc<l

U.S. adminis1ra1ion lhal feels 1hc need todo somethi ng :ihout
these sorts of prac1ices. Given that mnny of these prnc1iccs
arc though1 lo be morally wrong because or their rch11iu11ship to fundamental human rights. il seems clear that the
sort of state intervention llmt is being .tlludcd lo is none
other than "humanitarian intervention.'' Although 1hc classic definition of humanitarian intervention as "forcihlc self.
help by s1a1cs 10 pro1cc1 humnn rig hts" is still rcg;irdcd hy
many commentators as the preferred usage. there has hccn
a growing efforl on lhe part of olhers 10 expand lhis dcrini·
1io n 10 include forcihle self-help hy regional :111d in1crna1ional organi1..a1 iuns (and . perhaps. hy corpor:11 ions like Executive Outcomes). the 1hrcat or use of non-mili tary coercion (e.g .. economic boycotts) . .is well as non-coercive
measures (e.g., secret rinancial suppor1 of friendly polilicians).11 Of1hcse. perhaps it is coercive (mili l:try and nonmilitary) humanitarian intervention that is 1hc mosl co111rovcrsial . .since it is thi:-. sort of intervention that is must citctl
a.s involving the violation of a nation 's sovcrcignty. 1K Which
of 1hc prac1iccs cited above would be t>cs1 deali with by
mc.1n~offorciblc rniliiary hun1;mirnrinn intcrvc111ion"! Since
this sort of intervention is the most intrusive and tlcs1ruc1ive of the fom1s ofimervention. the source of the inhumanity lhat ism work in a country should be understood as something which is weJl.{lcflncd, singular in n:11urc. :uul set :1pan
rrom the victims. A despotic ruler would t,c a clear-cul example or such a source or inhumanily. or lhc three practices that have hccn ex:uninc<I, <mly !-;ing:,porc·._ punishmcnl
by caning and China's one-chilcl policy arc ohvious cases
of st:lle-dircclcd pract ices 1ha1 could be brought to an end
through overt or covert ,nilitary operations.:,.; Bui 1hc proh•
1cm is that na1ional sovereignty and terri torial integrity
should be respected and 1ho11heir violation should only OC·
cur in lhe most extreme of circumst:mccs.X• \Vhat sor1s of
conditions might we wanl to consider :t" having to he s:uislicd before such in1crvcn1 ion is thought lube morally jusli•
ficd'! T he just-warist perspective on the moral jus1ifica1ion
of going to w:ir-theju:r tul be/lum-rrovitlcs us with three
imporlan1 condit io ns: ( I) 1he principle of just cause: (2) 1hc
pri nciple of proportio nalily: and (3) lhe principle of las1 rcsort.31 Perhaps the only j ust cause 10 warrant the use of mi litary force in the protection of human rights would be if there
were egregious or gross human rights violations being com·
rniucd by a government. A It hough lhcrc is no clear ;.1grec·
rnent with regard 10 the mcnning of 1hc term 'gross human
rights violatio ns' as well as the sorts of acts considered 1n
be such violalions, lhe Uni1cd Nmions considers 1he following 10 be examples of gross human rights violations:
··genocide: slavery und slavery.. likc prac1ices: summary or
:irbilrary executions; 1or1urc and cruel. inhuman or degrading 1rentmcnt or pu nishment; enforced disappcar~1ncc: arbi·
trary and prolonged dc1cntion; dcpona1ion o r forcible lransrcr of populalion; and sys1cma1ic discriminalio n. in particular based on race o r gender."" Arc Singapore and China
guilly of such violations when ii comes to caning ;.tnd 1he
one-chi ld policy rc.<pcctivcly"! Perhaps, hul il doc.< nul scc111
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10 be obvious 10 us. A strong argument would have to be
prcscn1ed for 1his condi1ion 10 be mcl. Bui even if 1his condiiion is said 10 be sa1isfied, 1hc olher 1wo condi1ions appear
10 be obslaclcs for the immediaie use of force. TI1e principle
of proportionali1y may nol be mel because the amoun1 of
harm 10 persons as well as destruction of property ( i.e .. the
amoun1 of evil) for al l involved may 1101 ou1weigh 1he good
that is achieved by lhe use of mi litary force in protccling
human riglus. Moreover, 1hc principle of las1 resort requires
that all avenues 10 rec1ify 1he injuslice must be exhausied
prior 10 overt or covert miliiary aclion. It is unlikely that
1hcse avenues have been exhausted with regard to either practice. So it appears 1ha1 the use of forcible miliiary humanitarian in1crven1io n does nol seem to be jusiified for use
against Singapore and China.
What ubout coercive non•militr1ry humanitarian inter..
vcniion'! Is it morally permissible for 1he C li nton adminis1ra1ion 10 use such intervention 10 influence the leadership

of Sing:1porc to change its criminal code or IO persuade the
Chinese govl.!rnmcnt to rcfonnulatc its popul:ition comrol
policy'! In regards 10 Singapore's criminal code, an effort 10
induce a revision of the code could be made by linkingjudicial reform with n con1inuancc of good political. economic,
cuhural, and scientilic lies with the Uni led Srnles. Measures
such as culluml and economic boycons. as well as wi1hholding ccnain kinds of aid, freezing asseis. and imposing
various other economic and p0Jitical sanctions could be con·
sidcrcd by the administration. Of course. there is no prima
facic obligation for lhc U .S. to provide assistnncc to
Singapore. bu1 for 1he governmenl of 1he Uniied S1a1cs 10
link i1s graniing of foreign assis1ance to Singapore o n 1he
basis o f wheihcr 1ha1 country shares a particular
:uJministrntion's views on rrccdom , individual rights, pun·
ishmcnl, and social order 1m1y be taken as just another instance of coercive interference in the internal affairs of a
sovereign nation, an interference that m:1y have li ulc. if any·
1hing, to do with self-defense or 1hc prevention of gross violations of human rights, two recognized exceptions 10 the
general prohibition of assaulting a nation's sovereignty.
Many of 1hc same measures could be taken agains1
China nnd i1s one-child policy. but one measure 1ha1 has been
used ngninst China nnd 01her couniries 1ha1 h,1ve ndoplcd
"coercive" popula1ioncon1rol policies is the rcduc1io n/climina1ion of fomily planning assisiance. Forexam1>lc. uni ii 1he
19ROs lhe Uni1cd S1a1cs hnd a long his1ory of established
policies of giving family plnnning nssistancc 10 developing
coun1rics.JJ \Vith the firs1 1enn of the Reagan administra1ion. however, U.S. policy changed dramaiically. TI,e Rcpuhlican nc.lministraiion reversed U.S. policy and decided
It• cliiuin:111.: it!- funding or inrcrnotimwl family planning
progr.uns, which inclutlcd funding th;H wus connccccd '"'' ilh
ahonions. ·nic adminis1r~1ion firs! reduced U.S. con1ribu1ions. 1hen 1oially climinalcd iis funds 10 1hc ln1crna1ional
l'lannc<I l'arc111l11~>d l'cdcr:uiun (IPl'F) and 1he U11i1cd Nn1i11ns Popula1ion Fund (UNFPA). Aclion was 1aken agains1
1hc ll'PF because ii provided funds ror abor1ions, where:is
1hc dcfunding of 1hc UNFPA 100k pince because ii provided
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suppor1 10 China's "coercive" family planning program.
Although runding for family planning continued through
bilaieral programs under the auspices of the Uni1ed Srnies
Agency for ln1erna1ional Developmcn1 (USAID), the conlributions were for selccled programs and 1he conlributions
were m diminished levels.
Although some had hoped 1ha1 a change in adminis1ra1ions would bring a change in U.S. policy 1oward family
planning nssisiance, the arrival of 1he Bush adminis1ra1ion
only resuhed in 1hc continuation of 1he policies put fonh by
1he Reagan adminislralion. Presidcn1 Bush even wen! so far
as to veto several bills !hat were proposed by Congress 10
resiore funding for family planning programs. In 1995 lhc
Clin1on adminislration publicly announced i1s willingness
10 reassert U.S. leadership in !his area by sening aside a
record $547 million for family planning programs, but lime
will !ell whether the cffecis of the Reagan and Bush policies wi ll be reversed, thereby resulling in renewed efforls
lo fu rther reduce glohnl popula1ion grow1h." In 1hc mcan1imc, 1hc q ucs1ion should be asked, "Were 1hc poliiics of1hc
past two Republican administrations a case of conservative
American polilics and morali1y dictaling how China and
01her developing coun1rics should go about anempting 10
conirol thc size of !heir populations by interfering in individuals' choices about !heir reprocluc1i vc behavior?"
Bui whai abou1 the various forms of female gcni1al cir•
cumcision? Given 1ha1 the prac1ice is a culturally-based one.
the use of forcible military humanirnrian in1erven1ion docs
nol seem 10 be morally jus1ifiable. In 1his case, !he source of
1he evil is no1 well-defined, singular in naiure, and exiernal
to the vic1ims. Ralher, ii is pan of a lo11g sumdi11g cultural
tradilion. As fo r coercive non-mili 1ary humanitarian inierveniion, therc are measures like econom ic and cultural boycous and the wi1hholding of certain kinds of aid. Sanc1ions
like 1hese, however, have limi1ed leverage. since 1he coun1ries in which 1he practice of female genilal mu1ila1ion is
most prevalent nrc countries of the Third World, countries
which arc in dire need of assisiance from countries like 1he
United S1a1cs and Canada. Sanctions 1ha1 arc 1hough1 1ocnd
1he plight of women may in fac1 decrease the level of wellbeing of 1hosc already marginalized in the 1arge1ed coun1ry.
Perhaps lhc best approach 10 changing the cultural practices of a nation is by educating i1s citizens to refrain from
ccnnin prac1ices. But whaiever approach is adoplcd, 1arge1ed
groups may Slill view the "requcs1" for change 10 fail 1he
1cs1 of impnr1inli1y, whereby cultures arc 001 tre:ucd as having equal worlh and value.
In an age of ever increasing con1ac1s among peoples
who possess very different views on politics, economics.
religion. 11nd mornli1y. lhcrc will he :, growing desire hy
leaders of powerful naiiuns 10 judge ei1her 01hcr peoples'
beliefs and values according lo their own srnndards. or 10
make some son of anempl al being "fair" to all peoples all
the time. Yet we have t:,kcn issue with the tendency tow:trd:-:
moral universalism and cenirisin as well as 1he procli vity
1ownrds particularisms and polyccnlrism. Nci1her approach
in and ofilselfis sa1isfac1o ry; !here is no moral algorithm of
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any kind. It is against this backdrop that a different approach
unfolds: an approach according to which each prnc1icc must

be examined in its own right 10 determine if un ethics of
sovereignty or an ethics or superiori ty can be appropriately
applied 10 it. We hope that our examination of this issue has
made ii clear how real a problem this is for those who arc
moving into th e next millennium.
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